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1 Introduction
There is a plethora of empirical evidence that supports the Hicksian view (Hicks, 1935) that executive
compensation tends to be more performance-sensitive in more competitive environments (e.g. Nickell,
1996; Van Reenen, 2011). A series of empirical studies have used industry-specific regulatory reforms
to analyze the effect of competition on executive pay (Crawford, Ezzell, and Miles, 1995; Hubbard
and Palia, 1995; Kole and Lehn, 1999; Palia, 2000; Cuñat and Guadalupe, 2009a; Dasgupta, Li, and
Wang, 2017). These studies focus on how deregulation policies that increases competition in the product
market affect the structure of managerial incentive contracts. The main takeaway from this literature is
that, following a deregulation policy that intensifies product market competition, firms reduce managerial
slack by increasing executive compensation and strengthening its pay-performance sensitivity.
Our objective in this paper is to explain the nature of the aforementioned regularity, and to offer
new insights into how it is shaped by industry-specific features. First, we provide a simple model of
oligopolistic competition with firm entry that shows why incumbent firms find it optimal to reduce man-
agerial slack when competition rises due to deregulation. Then, we use our model to derive novel em-
pirical implications regarding the time to build production capacity in an industry. Our model shows that
this industry-specific feature is a crucial factor when analyzing the effect that firm entry has on executive
compensation. According to our model, the relationship observed in the empirical studies obtains only
in industries in which the time to build capacity is such that incumbents act as production leaders and
entrants as followers. This result goes in line with the empirical literature given that existing studies
focus on industries in which it takes time to build production capacity, such as banking, manufacturing,
and the airline industry.
The question of how product market competition shapes managerial incentives is far from new in the
literature.1 Notwithstanding, our approach is novel in that we analyze it explicitly in a framework of firm
entry. Because incumbent firms anticipate (and accommodate) future entry with relaxing regulation,
we use a standard model of sequential quantity-setting oligopoly, in which entrant firms choose their
managerial contracts and quantities after observing those of the incumbents. Our focus is on the strategic
response of incumbents regarding managerial incentive pay as they foresee the entry of new firms. In
line with the the empirical literature, our main finding is that it is optimal for incumbents to strengthen
incentive pay and reduce managerial slack when they foresee the entry of new firms into the product
market. Moreover, we show that the strength of the managerial incentives offered by incumbents is
increasing in the number of entrants – higher competitive pressure leads to steeper incentives and lower
managerial slack.
To highlight the role played by the time to build production capacity, we also analyze the case in
which the entrant firms set quantities and contracts along with the incumbents, instead of after them.
Accordingly, our sequential setting, in which entrants set contracts and quantities after the incumbents,
corresponds to industries in which it takes time to build production capacity (Allen, Deneckere, Faith,
and Kovenock, 2000). The simultaneous one, in which entrants set them along with the incumbents, cor-
responds to industries in which the time to build capacity is negligible (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983). In
the latter setting we find that the relationship between competition and managerial incentives is reversed:
incumbents find it optimal to offer weaker incentives to their managers, irrespective of the number of new
firms entering the market. Notably, this setting is equivalent to one in which the number of incumbents
1The notion that monopoly, and market power in general, are detrimental to managerial efficiency dates back to Smith
(1776, Book 1, Chapter 11), and has a long tradition in the literature (Leibenstein, 1966; Hart, 1983; Scharfstein, 1988).
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varies in a cross-section, i.e., to comparing two markets facing the same amount of entry that differ in
their original levels of competition. Under this light, our second result goes in line with previous litera-
ture which analyzes the effect of competition using comparative statics in the number of firms, instead
of via firm entry (e.g. Martin, 1993; Hermalin, 1994; Golan et al., 2015).
Our model incorporates managerial incentive contracts into the Stackelberg quantity competition
framework proposed by Daughety (1990). There is a fixed number of incumbents and a set of poten-
tial entrants with more entrants meaning greater competitive pressure on the incumbent firms. Both
incumbents (in the pre-entry stage) and entrants (in the post-entry stage) play Cournot games among
themselves; entrants take the aggregate output of incumbents as given. All firms are initially inefficient,
and each hires a risk neutral manager whose principal task is to exert non-verifiable R&D effort to bring
down the constant marginal cost of production, what is often termed “process innovation.” We assume
that the final realizations of marginal costs are private information among firms, and that incentive con-
tracts are publicly observable. Hence, even though the marginal costs of rival firms are unknown, each
firm observes a signal of how likely every other firm is to reduce its marginal cost.
The crux of our analysis is that managerial effort is beneficial to incumbents in two ways. First,
steeper incentives that induce each manager to exert higher effort directly increase the likelihood of a
cost reduction (value-of-cost-reduction effect). Second, they also alter the beliefs of the rival firms about
the true cost realization of a given firm (marginal-profitability-of-effort effect). Even if a manager fails
to achieve the cost target, her effort is profitable in as much as it makes the rivals believe that cost
reduction has actually been attained. More intensified product market competition affects each of these
two through the market size and the effective size of cost reduction. As the entrants’ optimal contracting
and production decisions are directly negatively affected by the aggregate incumbent output, the entry of
new firms implies an increase in both market size and the effective size of cost reduction for incumbents.
In turn, this implies both a higher expected value of cost reduction and expected marginal profitability
of effort, which makes it optimal for incumbents to elicit higher managerial effort by strengthening
incentives. It is worth noting that, even in the absence of the marginal-profitability-of-effort effect, a
growing number of entrants strengthens the value-of-cost-reduction effect. Such case arises, for example,
when marginal costs are public information and managerial effort is unprofitable beyond cost reduction.
We use our model to derive three testable implications related to the time to build production ca-
pacity in an industry. First, as mentioned earlier, firms in industries in which building capacity takes
time strengthen their managerial compensation packages as an optimal response to the entry of new
firms. However, the opposite obtains in industries in which production capacity may be acquired instan-
taneously. Second, regardless of the time to build capacity, the expected equilibrium price falls as new
firms enter the market. However, it drops more rapidly, as more firms enter the market, in markets in
which there is time to build capacity. This happens because incumbent firms reduce managerial slack by
strengthening incentives and thus are more likely to lower production costs and increase output. Finally,
although the profits of incumbent firms are decreasing in the number of entrants in markets with no time
to build capacity, they are not so when substantial time is required to build capacity. That is, by strength-
ening managerial incentives, incumbent firms offset the loss in profits caused by more competition.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature. In the next section,
we outline the model. In Section 4, we solve for the equilibrium and present our main results. In Section
5, we present the testable implications of our model, and we conclude in Section 6. All proofs are
relegated to Appendix B, most of which follow from Lemma 3 in Appendix A.
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2 Related literature and our contribution
The astounding rise in both the level and incentive component of executive compensation packages over
the past three decades is often attributed to changes in industry configurations. The idea is based on
the Darwinian view of organizations, which states that, in order to survive and perform well, firms must
solve governance problems by adapting their structure of managerial incentive contracts as product mar-
ket competition rises. As mentioned in the previous section, several studies have exploited regulatory
reforms to analyze how product market competition shapes the incentive structure of the executive com-
pensation packages. Kole and Lehn (1999), and Palia (2000) study how the introduction of the Airline
Deregulation Act in 1978 has altered the structure of the incentive contracts offered to CEOs in the U.S.
airline industry. Crawford et al. (1995), Hubbard and Palia (1995), and Cuñat and Guadalupe (2009a),
analyze the changes in executive pay in the U.S. banking sector following an important regulatory re-
form that permitted interstate banking during the 1980s. In the context of international trade, Cuñat
and Guadalupe (2009b) study the effect of changes in foreign competition on executive pay in the U.S.
firms. Dasgupta et al. (2017) analyze the effect of industry-level tariff cuts on CEOs pay-performance
sensitivity in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Overall, these studies confirm the view that one of the ways
in which firms react to intensifying product-market competition is by increasing the pay-performance
sensitivity of their executive compensation packages.2
In agency theoretic models relating product market competition to managerial incentives, competing
against more firms invariably reduces equilibrium output and profits.3 In turn, this lowers the value of
attaining a cost reduction and thus makes it optimal to offer waker managerial incentives (the so-called
scale or output effect). In a framework of hidden information (about the realization of marginal costs),
Martin (1993) assumes that the marginal productivity of managerial effort decreases in the number of
active firms in a Cournot market, and hence, the equilibrium state-contingent contracts provide weaker
incentives as the number of firms grows. Golan, Parlour, and Rajan (2015) also analyze managerial
incentives in a Cournot oligopoly. As the expected product market profit of each firm depends on the
likelihood of achieving a low marginal cost in the rival firms, the observed profit as a signal of manage-
rial effort becomes noisier, and hence, the cost of incentive provision magnifies in a more competitive
environment. This effect points in the same direction as the standard scale effect implying a negative
association between competition and incentives.
In order to counteract the negative effect of competition on managerial incentives due to lower prod-
uct market profits, one thus requires to identify additional countervailing effects of product market com-
petition on managerial incentives. The effect of competition on executive pay-performance sensitivity
may be, in theory, non-monotonic. Hermalin (1992) models CEOs as receiving a fraction of the share-
holder income. Because more intense competition erodes this income, managers tend to consume fewer
“agency goods”, i.e., expend more effort, as agency goods are assumed to be normal goods. Hermalin
(1994) assumes that more firms in a Cournot market implies an exogenous decrease in the slope of the
inverse market demand (with the intercept remaining constant), and hence, an exogenous increase in the
market size of each firm is identified as a countervailing business stealing effect, apart from the standard
value-of-cost-reduction effect. Schmidt (1997) shows that if a firm is more likely to go bankrupt in a more
competitive environment, the manager tends to work harder to avoid liquidation of the firm’s assets as
2In a related study, Karuna (2007) also finds a positive relationship between the degree of product substitutability and stock
options granted to CEOs.
3See Legros and Newman (2014) for an excellent survey of the extant literature.
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liquidation implies a loss of reputation. The value-of-cost-reduction effect and the threat-of-liquidation
effect do not often point in the same direction. Piccolo, D’Amato, and Martina (2008) build on Martin
(1993), and identify an agency effect. In their model, profit-sharing contracts improve productive effi-
ciency, which points in the opposite direction of the standard scale effect. They obtain an inverted-U
relationship between competition and managerial effort. Raith (2003) analyzes a managerial incentive
problem in a price-setting oligopoly with horizontal differentiation and privately realized marginal costs.
He establishes a positive association between competition and managerial incentives by showing that in
a free-entry equilibrium managerial incentives increase due to a higher degree of product substitutability,
market size or lower cost of entry. Wu (2017) analyzes the interaction between product and labor mar-
kets in a model that assigns worker talent to heterogeneous firms. Greater product market competition,
as measured by demand elasticity, results in a reallocation of more talented managers from smaller to
larger firms, and hence, an increase in the value of managerial efforts in such firms. Consequently, firms
strengthen managerial incentives, and the resulting wage distribution becomes more right-skewed.
Our approach is novel because we analyze a new mechanism through which product market compe-
tition affects executive pay-performance sensitivity. In particular, we study how incumbent firms adjust
their managerial contracts optimally when new firms are about to enter the market. As mentioned earlier,
a model of sequential quantity competition is appropriate to analyze the effect of increased competition
following a regulatory reform. In line with the empirical evidence, we find a positive relationship: as
competition rises, incumbents find it optimal to strengthen executive pay-performance sensitivity in or-
der to reduce managerial slack. Furthermore, we also contribute to the literature by noting that the time
to build production capacity in an industry is a key factor in studying how competition affects manage-
rial incentives. In particular, it allows us to relate our model to the earlier literature that find a negative
association between competition and managerial incentives. Therefore, our analysis adds to previous
literature and conforms to empirical findings.
3 The model
3.1 Specifications
The economy consists of two classes of risk neutral agents, n+m ex-ante identical firms who compete
in quantities in a market for a homogeneous good, and n+m ex-ante identical managers. The firms
are divided in two groups—namely, a subset I of n ≥ 1 incumbents and a subset J of m ≥ 0 entrants,
with I ∩ J = ∅. Our main objective is to analyze the effect of increased competition, i.e., an increase
in |J| = m, on the optimal managerial contracts in the firms that belong to I. Until section 4.5, where
we analyze cross-sectional variation in the number of incumbents, we consider I as a fixed collection
of incumbent firms. A typical incumbent firm is denoted by i, and a typical entrant, by j. Often for
convenience we will denote a generic firm (incumbent or entrant) by k ∈ I∪ J with |I∪ J|= n+m.
Let qk denote the production of firm k. The inverse market demand is given by P = 1−Q, where Q
denotes the aggregate industry output, and P the market price. Each firm k operates on a constant-returns-
to-scale production technology with marginal cost ck ∈ {0, c} where 0 < c < 1. Initially, all firms have
the inefficient technology, i.e., ck = c for all k. Each firm hires a manager whose principal task is to exert
non-verifiable R&D effort in order to mark down the marginal cost to 0. The probability that the marginal
cost is reduced is given by ek, which is the effort exerted by the manager of firm k. Each firm k offers its
5
manager a take-it-or-leave-it contract (wk(0), wk(c)) which is contingent on the realized marginal cost
ck ∈ {0, c}. Contracts are subject to limited liability of the managers. Managerial contracts are publicly
observable, but the realized marginal costs remain private information of the firms. Every manager has
the same effort cost function ψ(e) = e2/2, and her outside option is normalized to 0.
3.2 Timing of events
The timing of events, which is divided into two phases, is described in Figure 1. At date 1, the incumbents
hire a manager apiece by offering publicly observable contingent contracts. At t = 2, the manager at each
incumbent firm exerts non-verifiable effort, and the marginal cost of each incumbent is privately realized.
At t = 3, the incumbents simultaneously set quantities. After observing the aggregate quantities set by
the incumbents, the entrants repeat the timing at dates t = 1′, 2′, 3′. Finally, after date t = 3′, the market
price is set, and the profits of all firms (incumbents and entrants) are realized.
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 1′ t = 2′ t = 3′
Incumbents Entrants
Contracts Cost realizations Outputs Contracts Cost realizations Outputs
Figure 1: The timing of events in the sequential quantity-setting oligopoly.
3.3 Managerial contract and effort
Each manager k chooses her effort ek optimally, given the contracts wk(0) and wk(c) at firm k. Because
the realizations of marginal costs are independent, managerial contracts at each firm k are independent
of the realizations of marginal costs at the rival firms. The optimal effort at firm k is given by:
ek = argmax
eˆk
{
eˆkwk(0)+(1− eˆk)wk(c)− 12 eˆ
2
k
}
= wk ≡ wk(0)−wk(c). (IC)
The above is the incentive compatibility constraint of the manager at firm k in which wk represents
the incentive component of the managerial contract. Therefore, we will refer to a higher (lower) value
of wk, or equivalently, of ek as ‘stronger (weaker) managerial incentives’. We assume limited liability
(non-negative income for the manager at each state of nature), i.e.,
wk(c)≥ 0, and wk(0)≥ 0. (LL)
Finally, the expected utility of the manager at each firm k must be at least as high as her outside option
0, i.e., the participation constraint of the manager is given by:
uk ≡ ekwk(0)+(1− ek)wk(c)− 12 e
2
k ≥ 0. (PC)
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3.4 Quantity competition
We follow Daughety (1990), which is a generalization of the standard notion of Stackelberg competition,
to model market competition in the present context. After managers have exerted effort, each incum-
bent i learns its marginal cost ci privately. Then, the incumbent firms (the “leaders”) choose quantities
(q1, . . . , qn) simultaneously to maximize expected profit. After observing the aggregate incumbent quan-
tity, QI ≡∑i∈I qi, the entrants choose managerial contracts simultaneously, taking QI as given. Following
the choice of managerial effort, e j, each entrant firm j learns its marginal cost c j privately. Finally, the
entrant firms (the “followers”) choose quantities (q1, . . . , qm) in a Cournot fashion to maximize expected
profit. We assume that in equilibrium all m entrants decide to enter, i.e., regardless of their own and
the incumbents’ cost realizations, each entrant finds it optimal produce a positive output in equilibrium.
This rules out the possibility that the incumbents may deter entry. The incumbents are also assumed
to produce a positive output in equilibrium regardless of their realized marginal cost. This implies a
restriction of the parameter space—namely, an upper bound on c. This is an innocuous but conservative
assumption as the incentives to attain a low marginal cost would have been stronger otherwise. We solve
for the equilibrium by backward induction, and show that it is unique, and symmetric for incumbents
and entrants.
4 Managerial incentives in sequential oligopoly
4.1 Choice of quantities and managerial efforts by the entrants
Let QJ = ∑ j∈J q j be the aggregate entrant output, and q− j ≡ QJ−q j = ∑k∈J\{ j} qk, the aggregate output
of the rival entrants. Further, let the managerial effort and bonus vectors be denoted by (ei, e j) and
(wi, w j), respectively for i ∈ I and j ∈ J. At the quantity setting stage, t = 3′, each entrant j takes QI and
q− j as given to solve
max
q j
q j(1−QI−q j−Eq− j− c j).
The subgame played by the entrants at the the quantity setting stage, t = 3′, is simply a Cournot game
among m firms with a residual demand P = 1−QI −∑ j∈J q j. The quantity of each rival entrant is a
random variable because its realized marginal cost is unknown to entrant firm j. The expected cost of
firm j is Ec j = c(1− e j), where e j is the incentive compatible level of managerial effort chosen at date
t = 2′. Because the managerial contracts of all entrant firms are publicly observable, every firm j knows
the expected cost of every rival firm. Further, let e− j ≡ ∑k∈J\{ j} ek. The quantity and profit of each
entrant firm in the subgame perfect equilibrium are respectively given by:
q j(c j, e j, e− j, QI) =
2(1−QI)− (m+1)c j +(m−1)c(1+ e j)−2ce− j
2(m+1)
,
pi j(c j, e j, e− j, QI) =
{
2(1−QI)− (m+1)c j +(m−1)c(1+ e j)−2ce− j
2(m+1)
}2
.
Note that pi j(c j, e j, e− j, QI) is the expected market profit of each entrant firm j conditional on its realized
cost, c j. It depends on e j even when conditioning on c j because the effort exerted by the manager at firm
j pins down the beliefs of the rival entrants about c j. These beliefs affect the rivals’ output decisions in
the same way as e− j affects those of firm j, so the effort exerted by the manager at firm j is profitable
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beyond its cost realization. If the realized marginal costs were publicly observable, the product market
profits would not depend on managerial efforts; instead, they would depend on the observed numbers of
high- and low-cost firms (cf. Golan et al., 2015), and managerial effort would not be profitable beyond
the value of cost reduction.
The optimal contracting problem at t = 1′ at each entrant firm j is solved in two stages (e.g. Grossman
and Hart, 1983). First, firm j minimizes the expected incentive costs in order to implement a given level
of effort subject to the constraints described in Section 3.3, i.e.,
C j(e j) = min{w j(0),w j(c)}
e jw j(0)+(1− e j)w j(c), (Min j)
subject to (IC), (LL) and (PC).
The value function, called the ‘incentive cost function’, of the above minimization problem is given by:
C j(e j) =C(e j) = e2j for all j ∈ J.
In the second stage, firm j chooses the effort level e j in order to maximize the expected profits
Π j(e j, e− j, QI)≡ e jpi j(0, e j, e− j, QI)+(1− e j)pi j(c, e j, e− j, QI)
net of its incentive costs C(e j), i.e.,
max
e j
Π j(e j, e− j, QI)−C(e j). (Max j)
Let the equilibrium managerial effort in the entrant firms be denoted by eJ(QI, m), which is derived from
the first-order condition of the maximization problem (Max j). It is analyzed in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Given the aggregate output QI of the incumbent firms, the equilibrium managerial effort in
the entrant firms is unique, symmetric, and is given by:
eJ(QI, m) =
c[8m(1−QI)+ c(m2−6m+1)]
2[4(m+1)2+ c2(m−1)2] for all j ∈ J. (EE)
The higher the aggregate output of the incumbents, QI , the lower is the managerial effort in each entrant
firm. This is because when the aggregate output of the incumbents expands, the entrants face a shrunken
residual demand, and hence, it is optimal for each of them to offer weaker incentives to its manager,
which elicit lower effort.
4.2 Quantity choice of the incumbents
In setting quantities, the incumbents take into account the best response of the entrant firms and anticipate
their managerial efforts. Let q j(c j, e, QI) denote the quantity of an entrant firm j in the subgame perfect
equilibrium for a common level of effort e (among the entrants), i.e., with e j = e for all j ∈ J. Then, the
expected aggregate output of the entrants is given by:
QJ(QI, m) =∑
j∈J
Eq j(c j,eJ(QI,m),QI)
= κ(m)(C1−C2QI),
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where
κ(m)≡ m(m+1)
4(m+1)2+ c2(m−1)2
is an increasing function in m, and C2 ≡ 4+ c2 and C1 ≡ C2− c(4+ c2/2) are positive constants that
depend on c. Note that the aggregate best response is linear in the aggregate incumbent quantity QI ,
and it shifts upward as m grows as κ ′(m)> 0. Importantly, the cross-derivative ∂ 2QJ(QI,m)/∂m∂QI =
−C2κ ′(m) < 0, which means that the incumbents output softens the impact of firm entry on the market
price. As the incumbent firms behave in a Cournot fashion, each incumbent firm i solves the following
maximization problem at date t = 3:
max
qi
qi(1−qi−Eq−i−QJ(qi+Eq−i, m)− ci)
⇐⇒ max
qi
qi(A(m)−B(m)(qi+Eq−i)− ci), (1)
where A(m) ≡ 1−C1κ(m) and B(m) ≡ 1−C2κ(m). From the incumbents’ perspective, entry of new
firms implies two countervailing effects. On the one hand, more firms implies a lower market price,
i.e., A(m)< 1. However, as the aggregate incumbent output diminishes the optimal effort and output of
entrants, it also implies that the price is less responsive to the incumbents output, i.e., B(m) < 1. This
gives them more leeway; they can increase output without reducing the equilibrium price too much. For
reasons that will become clear below, it is convenient to consider these effects in a different but equivalent
way. Note that the solution to (1) is equivalent to the solution of the following ‘normalized’ problem:
max
qi
qi(a(m)− (qi+Eq−i)−θ(m)ci),
where
a(m)≡ A(m)
B(m)
=
1−C1κ(m)
1−C2κ(m) , θ(m)≡
1
B(m)
=
1
1−C2κ(m) with a
′(m), θ ′(m)> 0.
That is, from the perspective of each incumbent i, the entry of new firms is equivalent to an increase
in the market size, a(m) > 1, and the size of cost reduction, θ(m)c > c. This means that, even though
entrants reduce the market price, the market size increases from the incumbents perspective as the price
is less responsive to their output. Which also equates to a higher size of cost reduction.
We depict the equivalence mentioned above graphically in Figure 2 by means of the marginal revenue
(derived from the residual demand faced by i) and marginal cost curves. The solid downward sloping
line is the marginal revenue function derived from the residual demand [A(m)−B(m)Eq−i]−B(m)qi of
incumbent i for m > 0. This marginal revenue function has a slope equal to −2B(m). The maximum
price is represented by the point A(m)−B(m)Eq−i, and the market size is represented by a(m)−Eq−i.
Hence, the horizontal intercept of the marginal revenue function is given by [a(m)−Eq−i]/2. If there
were no entrants, we would have A(0) = B(0) = 1. Following the entry of at least one firm, we have
A(m) < 1 and B(m) < 1. The solid horizontal line is the marginal cost of a high-cost incumbent i. The
equilibrium quantity qi(c, m) is determined by the intersection of the marginal revenue and marginal cost
of the high-cost incumbent i for a given number of entrants m. The normalized marginal revenue function
that is derived from the normalized residual demand a(m)−Eq−i−qi with a(m)> 1, and the normalized
marginal cost curve, θ(m)c, are shown by the dashed lines. The normalized marginal revenue curve is
steeper than the actual marginal revenue curve because it has a slope equal to −2. These two normalized
functions intersect at the same equilibrium output level qi(c, m) of each high-cost incumbent. For each
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MR and MC
qi(0, m)
a(m)−Eq−i
A(m)−B(m)Eq−i
c
qi(c, m)
θ(m)c
1−Eq−i
Figure 2: The optimal output of a representative incumbent firm for a given number of entrants under
the actual (solid line) and normalized (dashed line) marginal revenue and cost functions.
low-cost incumbent, the equilibrium quantity is given by qi(0, m) = [a(m)−Eq−i]/2 because for such a
firm i, ci = θ(m)ci = 0.
Let e−i = ∑l∈I\{i} el be the aggregate managerial efforts of the rival incumbents. The equilibrium
output and profit of incumbents are described in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Given the number of entrants, m, the privately realized marginal costs {c1, . . . , cn}, and
the managerial efforts {e1, . . . , en} at the incumbent firms, the equilibrium quantity and profit of each
incumbent firm are respectively given by:
qi(ci, ei, e−i, m) =
2a(m)− (n+1)θ(m)ci+(n−1)θ(m)c(1+ ei)−2θ(m)ce−i
2(n+1)
,
pii(ci, ei, e−i, m) =
{
2a(m)− (n+1)θ(m)ci+(n−1)θ(m)c(1+ ei)−2θ(m)ce−i
2(n+1)
}2
.
Although the equilibrium quantity and profit of each entrant j depend on the aggregate incumbent quan-
tity QI , those of each incumbent firm i do not depend on the entrant quantity because the incumbents
act as Stackelberg leaders in the product market. But they do depend on the number of entrants via the
market size a(m) and the size of cost reduction θ(m)c for the incumbent firms.
4.3 Equilibrium managerial efforts and incentives in the incumbent firms
In the contracting stage at date 1, each incumbent firm i solves a maximization problem similar to
(Max j) (replace j by i everywhere, and drop QI from the profit function). Define by ∆pii(ei, e−i, m) ≡
pii(0, ei, e−i, m)− pii(c, ei, e−i, m) the expected value of cost reduction of each incumbent firm i. The
first-order condition for the contracting problem of each incumbent i is given by:
∂Πi(ei, e−i, m)
∂ei
≡ ∆pii(ei, e−i, m)+
[
ei
∂pii(0, ei, e−i, m)
∂ei
+(1− ei) ∂pii(c, ei, e−i, m)∂ei
]
= 2ei. (FOCi)
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At the optimal managerial effort, the marginal benefit of effort is equalized with the marginal incentive
cost. The left-hand-side of (FOCi) is the marginal benefit of effort which comprises of two terms—
namely, the expected value of cost reduction, ∆pii(ei, e−i, m), and the expected marginal profitability of
effort, E[∂pii(ci, ei, e−i, m)/∂ei]. On the right-hand-side of the above equation is the marginal incentive
cost, C′(ei). Let the equilibrium managerial effort and incentives of incumbents be denoted by eI(m) and
wI(m), respectively, which are determined from (FOCi) and (IC). Note also that the manager’s utility,
i.e., the net level of compensation of the manager in each incumbent firm is given by:
uI(m)≡ eI(m)wI(m)− 12 (eI(m))
2 =
1
2
(wI(m))2. (2)
The following proposition describes the equilibrium managerial effort, incentives, and the level of exec-
utive compensation in the incumbent firms.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium managerial effort and incentives at the incumbent firms are unique, sym-
metric, and given by:
eI(m) = wI(m) =
θ(m)c[8a(m)n+θ(m)c(n2−6n+1)]
2[4(n+1)2+{θ(m)c}2(n−1)2] ∈ (0, 1). (EI)
The equilibrium utility accrued to each manager at the incumbent firms is given by uI(m), as in (2).
Moreover, for fixed n ≥ 1 and m ≥ 0, there exists cˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that every firm (incumbent or entrant)
produces a positive output in equilibrium regardless of its realized cost, provided that c ∈ (0, cˆ).
Note that the first-order condition (FOCi) defines implicitly the best reply in effort at firm i as a function
of the aggregate effort at the rival incumbent firms, e−i, which is linear and downward sloping (see
proof of Lemma 3(a) in Appendix A for more details). Managerial efforts and incentives are strategic
substitutes. As a result, the symmetric equilibrium effort eI(m) is the unique equilibrium outcome. Now,
in order to determine the equilibrium managerial effort, we evaluate the first-order condition (FOCi) at a
common effort level e. The marginal benefit of effort, denoted by MB(e, m), is strictly decreasing in e as
shown by the downward sloping line in Figure 3. The upward sloping line, labeled C′(e), is the marginal
incentive cost as a function of e. The intersection of MB(e, m) and C′(e) yields the unique equilibrium
managerial effort eI(m).
To find the upper bound cˆ on the high marginal cost, note that the firm that produces the least in
equilibrium is a high-cost entrant in a market in which all incumbents are low-cost. Let qi(ci, e, m) denote
the equilibrium output of an incumbent firm i at marginal cost ci and a common effort level e (among
the incumbents), which is obtained from Lemma 2. Let QˆI ≡ ∑i∈I qi(0, eI(m), m) be the aggregate
incumbents output at equilibrium when all of them are low-cost. The upper bound cˆ is implicitly defined
by q j(c, eJ(QˆI,m), QˆI) = 0. For more details, see the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B.
4.4 Competition and managerial incentives in the incumbent firms
Our objective is to analyze how increased competition due to the entry of new firms into the market
affects the provision of managerial incentives at the incumbent firms. The following proposition states
our main result.
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Figure 3: The equilibrium managerial effort in the incumbent firms.
Proposition 2 Let m′ > m≥ 0. Given any number of incumbents n≥ 1, entry of new firms induces each
incumbent firm to elicit higher managerial effort, i.e., eI(m′) > eI(m), by providing stronger incentives,
i.e., wI(m′)> wI(m), and higher compensation, i.e., uI(m′)> uI(m).
The above proposition implies two sorts of effects of competition on managerial incentives. The first
one is an extensive margin effect. The equilibrium managerial effort, incentives, and compensations,
are lower in the incumbent firms in the absence of any entrant firm. Even the entry of only one firm
which sets quantity as a Stackelberg follower induces the incumbents to elicit higher managerial effort
by offering stronger incentives and compensation. This is a consequence of the fact that both eI(m)
and wI(m) are strictly increasing in m. The second is an intensive margin effect. As the competitive
pressure intensifies, each incumbent firm elicits higher managerial effort and offers stronger incentives
and compensations. On both grounds, Proposition 2 conforms to the ‘managerial talent hypothesis’ in
the sense that greater compensation and stronger incentives imply that more talented managers would be
lured into a more competitive environment.
The proof of Proposition 2 consists in showing that the equilibrium effort elicited by the incumbents,
eI(m) given in (EI), is increasing in both the market size, a(m), and the size of cost reduction, θ(m)c, both
of which are increasing functions of m. In order to see why entry of new firms induces the incumbents
to elicit higher managerial effort, we analyze how an increased number of entrants affects the expected
value of cost reduction and the expected marginal profitability of effort of incumbents, i.e., the two terms
in the left-hand-side of (FOCi) evaluated at a common effort level e at the incumbent firms.
The effect of an increase in the number of entrants on the equilibrium output of both low- and high-
cost incumbents is shown in Figure 4. Entry of new firms induces the low-cost incumbents to produce
more because both their market size and size of cost reduction increase. As a(m) and θ(m) are both
increasing functions of m, entry benefits the low-cost incumbents implying that qi(0, e, m) is strictly
increasing in m. The same does not obtain for high-cost incumbents. The direction of the change in
qi(c, e, m) following an increase in the number of entrants is a priori ambiguous because both a(m) and
θ(m) are increasing in m. From Figure 4, it is immediate to see that qi(c, e, m) is decreasing in m if and
only if a′(m)−θ ′(m)c< 0, which turns out to be the case, i.e., the loss to the high-cost incumbents due to
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Figure 4: Effect of an increase in the number of entrants from m to m′ on the equilibrium outputs of
low- and high-cost incumbents. Let a ≡ a(m)−Eq−i, a′ ≡ a(m′)−Eq−i, qci ≡ qi(ci, e, m) and q′ci ≡
qi(ci, e, m′) for ci ∈ {0, c}. Following an increase in m, q0 increases to q′0, but qc decreases to q′c.
an increase in the size of cost reduction outweighs the gain from an increase in market size.4 Therefore,
the entry of new firms strengthens the ‘value-of-cost-reduction effect’ because
d∆pii(e, m)
dm
= 2
[
qi(0, e, m) · dqi(0, e, m)dm −qi(c, e, m) ·
dqi(c, e, m)
dm
]
> 0,
where ∆pii(e, m) denotes the expected value of cost reduction of an incumbent firm at a common effort
level e (among the incumbents).
An increase in the number of entrants also affects the expected marginal profitability of effort. Fol-
lowing the above notation, let pii(ci, e, m) denote the expected equilibrium profits of an incumbent firm,
conditional on having realized marginal cost ci, at a common effort level e (among the incumbents). Be-
cause the marginal productivity of effort is the same for every incumbent regardless of its realized cost
at a common effort level e (follows from Lemma 2), we may write the expected marginal profitability of
effort at any incumbent firm i as:
E
[
∂pii(ci, e, m)
∂ei
]
= 2 [eqi(0, e, m)+(1− e)qi(c, e, m)] · ∂qi(ci, e, m)∂ei ,
where the term in square braces is the expected optimal output of each incumbent. We show that
E [∂pii(ci, e, m)/∂ei] is an increasing function of m. First, note that the marginal productivity of ef-
fort is increasing in m, i.e., ∂ 2qi(ci, e, m)/∂ei∂m > 0. Regardless of its cost realization, an incumbent’s
4Note that
a′(m)−θ ′(m)c =− c
3θ(m)2κ ′(m)
2[1−C2κ(m)]2
< 0
because κ ′(m)> 0. See Appendix B for details.
13
optimal output is higher if its manager elicits more effort. As mentioned earlier, this is because the
elicited effort pins down the beliefs of the rival firms over having attained lower marginal cost. But
beyond this, the marginal productivity of effort is increasing in the number of entrants because it is pro-
portional to the size of cost reduction, which is increasing in m. Therefore, a sufficient condition for the
‘marginal-profitability-of-effort effect’ to be positive is that the expected incumbent output is increasing
in the number of entrants. Showing this is not straightforward as only the output of low-cost incumbents
is increasing in m. It turns out that the expected output is increasing in the number of entrants if the prob-
ability of accomplishing cost reduction is sufficiently high. At a common effort level e, this is equivalent
to
e >
c2
2(4+ c2)
.
The difficulty of showing the above inequality at the equilibrium effort level, e = eI(m), is that both
sides are increasing functions of c. Becasue the upper bound cˆ does not have a closed form solution (see
Appendix B), it is simpler to verify that the condition holds numerically, by doing an extensive search in
the parameter space.5
Given that both the ‘value-of-cost-reduction effect’ and the ‘marginal-profitability-of-effort effect’
are increasing in the number of entrants, the aggregate effect of an increase in the number of entrants on
the marginal benefit of effort is positive. That is, at a common effort level e,
d[∂Πi(e, m)/∂ei]
dm
=
d∆pii(e, m)
dm
+
dE[∂pii(ci, e, m)/∂ei]
dm
> 0.
Therefore, at a common effort level e, an increase in m shifts up the left-hand-side of (FOCi) (the marginal
effort benefit, i.e., the MB(e, m) curve in Figure 3), and does not affect the right-hand-side (the marginal
effort cost, i.e., the C′(e) curve in Figure 3), causing the symmetric equilibrium effort in each incumbent
firm to increase.
4.5 Cross-sectional variation in the number of incumbents
Up to this point, we have maintained the number of incumbents fixed. To emphasize the significance of
Proposition 2, we analyze how equilibrium managerial effort varies with the number of incumbents, n
for a fixed number of entrants. This corresponds to comparing the managerial contracts offered at firms
in two markets that face the same amount of competitive pressure (same number of entrants), but one
of which is initially more competitive than the other (has more incumbents). Let eI(n, m) ≡ eI(m), and
wI(n, m)≡ wI(m), as defined in (EI), and uI(n, m)≡ uI(m), as defined in (2). (In this section we take the
liberty of using notation defined previously, but change m for n to highlight the comparative statics in n.)
Proposition 3 Let n′> n≥ 1. Given any fixed number of entrants m≥ 0, incumbents in more competitive
markets, i.e., in ones with more incumbents, elicit lower managerial effort, i.e., eI(n′, m) < eI(n, m),
by providing weaker incentives, i.e., wI(n′, m) < wI(n, m), and lower compensation, i.e., uI(n′, m) <
uI(n, m).
The marginal benefit of effort, the left-hand-side of (FOCi), differs in two ways in markets that are
initially more competitive. The first one is through the standard ‘output channel’. More incumbents
5Despite the fact that we prove this claim numerically, the proof of Proposition 2 is fully analytical. For more details on
this and the other claims below that we show numerically, see Appendix C.
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means greater aggregate production by rivals which implies that each firm optimally reduces its output
at any realization of marginal cost as quantities are strategic substitutes. The expected value of cost
reduction is lower as the effect of the number of incumbents on the optimal output level does not depend
on the realized cost. That is, because ∂qi(0, e, n)/∂n = ∂qi(c, e, n)/∂n < 0, one obtains
d∆pii(e, n)
dn
= 2 [qi(0, e, n)−qi(c, e, n)] · ∂qi(ci, e, n)∂n < 0.
Notably, this ‘value-of-cost-reduction effect’ would work under the same logic if the realizations of
marginal costs would have been public knowledge.
Due to the presence of privately realized marginal costs, a higher number of incumbents also changes
the marginal benefit of managerial effort through the ‘marginal-profitability-of-effort’ effect. By eliciting
a higher managerial effort, each incumbent i induces its rivals to believe that it has attained a low marginal
cost, and hence, the aggregate rival quantity is lower in expectation. This raises the expected market price,
and hence, the expected profits of firm i, i.e., E[∂pii(ci, e, n)/∂ei]> 0 at any realization of marginal cost.
The marginal profitability of effort is greater if rivals believe that a given firm has attained cost reduction.
In a more concentrated market (less firms) it is easier to influence rivals by affecting their beliefs, and
hence, the marginal profitability of effort is increasing in the number of incumbents. In a market with
many firms, by contrast, it is harder that more rivals are so influenced (as there are more firms). Thus,
the marginal profitability of effort is decreasing in the number of incumbents in competitive markets.
Formally,
dE[∂pii(ci, e, n)/∂ei]
dn
=− θ(m)c(n−3)[a(m)−θ(m)c(1− e)]
(n+1)3
,
which is strictly positive (negative) for n < (>)3 as c < cˆ < a(m)/θ(m). (To see why this last inequality
holds, note that the equilibrium output of a high-cost incumbent would be negative otherwise. See the
proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B for more details.). Thus, the effect of an increase in n on the
marginal profitability of effort may be positive or negative depending on the number of incumbents.
Nonetheless, in either case, the aggregate effect of a higher number of incumbents on the marginal
benefit of effort turns out to be always negative, i.e., MB(e, n) in Figure 3 shifts down as n increases with
C′(e) remaining unaltered, and hence, eI(n, m) is decreasing in n. To see this formally, it suffices to note
d MB(e, n)
dn
=
d∆pii(e,n)
dn
+
dE[∂pii(ci, e,n)/∂ei]
dn
=−2θ(m)c(n−1)[a(m)−θ(m)c(1− e)]
(n+1)3
< 0.
The crucial difference between varying the number of entrants and incumbents, is that the entry of
new firms affects the incumbents’ output decision by altering their effective market size and the size
of cost reduction. If there are more incumbents to start with, this alters directly the number of firms
incumbents are competing against, and leaves the market size and the size of cost reduction unaffected.
The juxtaposition of propositions 2 and 3 highlights the driving force underlying our main result. The fact
that incumbents find it optimal to elicit higher managerial effort by offering steeper incentive contracts
when they foresee the entry of new firms to the market, is due to incumbents being able to affect the
entrants’ output decisions by committing to an output level before they start producing.
4.6 Managerial incentives in simultaneous oligopoly
The objective of this section is to analyze the effect of entry on managerial efforts and incentives in
the incumbent firms when the m entrant firms are allowed set quantities simultaneously along with the
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n incumbents. The simultaneous setting is nothing but a Cournot market with n+m symmetric firms
and privately realized marginal costs (c1, . . . , cn, c1, . . . , cm). The equilibrium managerial effort in each
firm (incumbent or entrant) can be obtained directly from the expression (EI) as follows. As the entrants
are treated equally as the incumbents, remove the entrants by setting m = 0, and replace the number of
incumbents, n, by n+m. In this case, a(m) = θ(m) = 1.
Let the symmetric equilibrium managerial effort and incentives in each firm (incumbent or entrant)
be denoted by esim(n+m) and wsim(n+m), respectively, and note that a manager’s equilibrium utility is
given by:
usim(n+m)≡ esim(n+m)wsim(n+m)− 1
2
(esim(n+m))2 =
1
2
(wsim(n+m))2.
The effect of an entrant in an incumbent’s optimal managerial effort and contract in this setting is
analogous to considering a market that has one more incumbent (in this setting, entrants and incumbents
are symmetric). Hence, we obtain the following corollary directly from Proposition 3.
Corollary 1 Let m′ > m≥ 0. In a simultaneous quantity-setting oligopoly in which m entrants set quan-
tities and managerial contracts along n≥ 1 incumbents, entry of new firms implies that each incumbent
elicits lower managerial effort, i.e., esim(n+m′) < esim(n+m), by providing weaker incentives to its
manager, i.e., wsim(n+m′)< wsim(n+m), and lower compensation, i.e., usim(n+m′)< usim(n+m).
The result in Corollary 1 is not new in the literature (see Martin, 1993; Hermalin, 1994; Golan
et al., 2015). The intuition behind it goes in the same line as the one underlying Proposition 3. The
entrants affect the marginal benefit of effort of the incumbents through the ‘value-of-cost-reduction’ and
‘marginal-profitability-of-effort’ effects. As noted in section 4.5 above, in this case the entrants imply a
lower expected value of cost reduction for the incumbents, and also a lower expected marginal profit of
effort as long as the market is already sufficiently competitive or, equivalently, the number of entrants is
sufficiently high, i.e., as long as n+m > 3. In contrast to when the entrants act as followers by setting
contracts and quantities after the incumbents, in this case, the entrants do not change the market size or
the size of cost reduction for the incumbents. Notably, as highlighted in the extant literature, the result
in Corollary 1 does not depend on marginal costs being privately realized. On the contrary, we show that
the negative effect of competition on managerial incentives in this setting is reinforced with privately
realized marginal costs if the market is sufficiently competitive.
5 Testable implications
5.1 Nature of industry competition and time to build production capacity
A key insight of our stylized model is the juxtaposition of Proposition 2 with Corollary 1. If entrants set
quantities sequentially, incumbent firms offer stronger managerial incentives as the number of entrants
grows, whereas the opposite is obtained if they set quantities simultaneously, along with the incum-
bents. How can one relate these contrasting results to the nature of competition that prevails in various
industries?
In a seminal contribution to the literature on oligopolistic competition, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)
analyze a two-stage game where firms simultaneously choose their production capacities in the first stage,
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and compete in prices in the stage that follows. They show, under very general conditions, that simulta-
neous capacity pre-commitment followed by price competition yields the Cournot outcome. By contrast,
Allen et al. (2000) show that when firms choose capacities sequentially, i.e., the entrant firms choose
capacities after observing the capacities set by the incumbents, and then the firms compete in prices,
the subgame perfect equilibrium yields the Stackelberg outcome. An entrant firm cannot instantaneously
adjust its capacity as it requires time to build, which is the crux of Allen et al.’s (2000) analysis. Thus, the
Cournot outcome, which is the result of simultaneous capacity pre-commitment both by the incumbents
and entrants (followed by price competition), is based on a no-time-to-build assumption. This disparity
in the time taken to build production capacity implies the following.
Implication 1 In an industry where production capacity requires ‘time to build’, the incumbent firms
offer higher managerial compensation and stronger incentive pay following an increase in the market
competition induced by the entry of new firms. By contrast, if the production capacity can be adjusted in-
stantaneously, entry of new firms implies that incumbents would provide lower compensation and weaker
incentives to their managers following entry.
Production capacities can be built almost instantaneously due to the presence of low sunk costs
in industries, e.g. services and technology. Therefore, our results imply that more competition may
be detrimental to managerial performance in such industries. On the other hand, in industries where
capacity requires time to build, such as the airline or banking industries, more competition in the form
of firm entry forces incumbents to improve their managerial performance by offering steeper incentive
contracts.
It is worth emphasizing that Implication 1 applies both at the extensive and the intensive margins.
When there is (no) time to build production capacity, both (i) firm entry increases (decreases) incumbents
managerial effort and managerial pay, i.e., at the extensive margin, and (ii) a higher number of entrants
increases (decreases) each incumbent’s managerial effort and incentive pay by a larger magnitude, i.e.,
at the intensive margin. Figure 5 depicts the juxtaposition of Proposition 2 with Corollary 1. From (EI)
it follows that eI(n,0) = esim(n+0). In the absence of any entrant firm (m = 0), the equilibrium efforts
coincide because it makes no difference whether entrants set managerial contracts and quantities after
or along with the incumbents. Because eI(n,m) is strictly increasing in m, and esim(n+m) is strictly
decreasing in m, the equilibrium managerial incentives are not only higher when time is required to build
capacity, but also their differences magnify as the number of entrants grows. Therefore, even a mo-
nopolist incumbent (n = 1) would respond more aggressively to an increase in the threat of competition
under time-to-build-capacity, whereas she would provide weaker managerial incentives if the time to
build capacity were negligible.
5.2 Equilibrium product market prices and profits
We focus on the effect that entry of new firms has on the equilibrium expected market price and the
incumbents’ expected market profits. Rather than dealing with the analytical complexity of these two
equilibrium objects, we simplify the analysis by analyzing them numerically. We use a granular grid of
the model’s parameters to validate Implications 2 and 3 below.6
6For more details on the numeric implementation of the model, see Appendix C.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium managerial effort as a function of the number of entrants m under simultaneous
and sequential quantity-setting oligopolies for a given number of incumbents n.
Implication 2 Under both market structures, simultaneous and sequential oligopolies, the equilibrium
expected market price decreases with the number of entrants. However, it is higher when the entrants
set quantities simultaneously along with the incumbents than when they set them after, as Stackelberg
followers.
Implication 2 encapsulates two observations. First, the expected market price is decreasing in the
number of entrants, whatever may be the nature of competition, simultaneous or sequential (or the time
to build production capacity). This is not surprising because more firms implies a higher aggregate
output. However, the price decreases more rapidly in the number of entrants when they set quantities
after the incumbents. This is because in the simultaneous case, all firms are symmetric, and hence, the
expected equilibrium outputs of the incumbents and entrants are equal. By contrast, in the sequential
case, a higher output by an incumbent translates into a lower output by all the entrants, both directly
through diminishing the price and indirectly through the reduction in the managerial incentives of every
entrant firm. Second, whatever may be the number of incumbents, the expected market price is lower
when entrants produce sequentially. These two observations can be appreciated in Figure 6, which plots
the equilibrium expected market price as a function of m and n, for a given value of c. Even though the
plots are for a fixed value of c, we show numerically that the same holds over the entire parameter space.
The comparison of price levels under the two market structures suggests that the sequential quantity-
setting oligopoly represents more intense competition than the simultaneous quantity-setting oligopoly.
Or equivalently, in the lines of Implication 1, that the time to build capacity in an industry may be
reflected in the way that firm entry affects the market price.
Implication 3 The equilibrium expected market profits of each incumbent decrease with the number of
entrants when these set quantities along with the incumbents simultaneously. By contrast, the equilibrium
expected market profits of each incumbent are increasing when the entrants set quantities afterwards, as
Stackelberg followers.
According to Implication 3, the expected market profits behave qualitatively similar to the managerial
18
Figure 6: Equilibrium expected price in simultaneous and sequential oligopolies
effort in equilibrium (cf. Proposition 2): the higher the number of entrants, the higher are the expected
market profits of the incumbents. This result goes in line with our finding in the previous section; namely,
with the fact that the incumbents equilibrium expected output is increasing in the number of entrants. By
strengthening managerial incentives, incumbents counteract the effect that the entry of new firms has on
market price. Interestingly, the size of the relative change in profits is small relative to that undergone
when entrants set quantities along with the incumbents simultaneously. This can be seen in Figure 7.
Although equilibrium profits are clearly decreasing in the number of firms when entrants set quantities
simultaneously, they increase only slightly when entrants are Stackelberg followers. Indeed, incumbent
profits seem to be flat graphically. Nonetheless, we show numerically that they are not; they are strictly
increasing in the number of entrants over the entire parameter space.
Figure 7: Equilibrium expected product market profits of each incumbent in the simultaneous and se-
quential oligopolies
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6 Conclusion
Motivated by empirical evidence, in this paper we investigate how firms adjust executive compensation
packages following deregulation policies that intensify product market competition by allowing the entry
of new firms. Using a standard incentive contracting model under quantity-setting oligopoly, we show
that incumbent firms find it optimal to elicit higher managerial effort by offering stronger incentive
contracts when they foresee entry of new firms into the product market. Our model allows us to tease
out in detail the channels through which product market competition affects managerial incentives in a
setting with firm entry. In our model, the key features that link the number of entrants with an incumbent’s
contracting problem are the market size and the size of cost reduction, both of which affect the marginal
benefit of effort, through the expected value of cost reduction, and the expected marginal profitability
of effort. By showing that firm entry increases both the market size and the size of cost reduction
for incumbents, and analyzing, in turn, how these two affect the expected value of cost reduction, and
the expected marginal profitability of effort, we show that incumbents find it optimal to offer stronger
managerial incentives when new firms enter the market. Furthermore, we also show that the magnitude
in which incumbents strengthen managerial incentives is increasing in the number of entrants: a higher
competitive pressure triggers a starker reaction by the incumbents.
Beyond conforming to the empirical regularities, our model also sheds light on how the nature of
competition in product market affects managerial incentives. Namely, we explore the connection between
the time to build production capacity in an industry and the effect that product market competition has on
managerial incentives. We find that firm entry increases the pay-performance sensitivity of managerial
contracts in markets in which production capacity takes time to build. In other words, the key driver
of our result is that entrants act as Stackelberg followers in the product market by taking the aggregate
output of incumbents as given. In the opposite case in which production capacity may be obtained
instantaneously, i.e., entrants are symmetric to incumbents and set contracts and output simultaneously
along with them, the association is negative: incumbents find it optimal to offer weaker managerial
incentives as more firms enter the market. Notably, this setting is equivalent to comparing a market that
is already more competitive (with more incumbents in the first place). Hence, our model relates to the
previous literature by replicating the known result that firms in Cournot markets with more firms offer
weaker incentives. However, we show that this case is reinforced regardless of the number of entrants.
Incumbents in markets that were already more competitive offer weaker managerial incentives even if
there is competitive pressure, as long as it is constant (same number of entrants).
20
Appendices
A The base model
The subgames played by the entrants and the incumbents have the same underlying structure. In this
section, we analyze a more general version of the simultaneous quantity competition model with a fixed
number N of firms, called the base model, which yields most of the results in Section 4. Let K be the set
of firms, with |K|= N ≥ 1, and index firms with k. Let P = A−BQ be the inverse market demand with
A, B > 0. The marginal cost of a representative firm k is given by ck, with ck ∈ {0, c} with c∈ (0, c¯). The
upper bound c¯ is such that all firms produce a positive output in equilibrium regardless of their realized
marginal costs. We will prove that such bound exists. Define by a ≡ A/B the market size of each firm,
and θ ≡ 1/B so that θc represents the size of cost reduction of each firm. The following lemma describes
the main results of the base model.
Lemma 3 Consider the base model.
(a) The equilibrium effort is symmetric and unique across all firms. It is given by:
e(N) =
θc[8aN+θc(N2−6N+1)]
2[4(N+1)2+θ 2c2(N−1)2] . (EC)
Moreover, the second order condition associated with the individual firm maximization problem in
a Bayesian Cournot equilibrium is satisfied for every firm if all of them produce a positive quantity
in equilibrium.
(b) If a and θ are independent of c, then there is c¯ ∈ (0, a/θ) such that, if c ∈ (0, c¯), every firm
produces a strictly positive quantity of output and elicits strictly positive level of managerial effort
in a symmetric equilibrium, regardless of its realized marginal cost.
(c) If c ∈ (0, c¯), the equilibrium effort in (EC) is decreasing in the number of firms, and increasing in
the market size and the size of cost reduction. That is, for every N ≥ 1,
de(N)
dN
< 0,
de(N)
da
> 0, and
de(N)
d(θc)
> 0.
Proof
(a) Once all the contracts are observed and marginal costs are privately realized, each firm k solves
max
qk
qk[A−B(qk +Eq−k)− ck].
The first-order condition of the above maximization problem is given by:
A−2Bqk−BEq−k− ck = 0
⇐⇒ 2Bqk = A− ck−BEq−k
⇐⇒ qk(ck, Eq−k) = A− ck2B −
1
2
Eq−k. (3)
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Taking expectation in the above equation, we get
Eqk =
A−Eck
2B
− 1
2
Eq−k =
A− c(1− ek)
2B
− 1
2
Eq−k. (4)
Summing the above over k we get
N
∑
k=1
Eqk =
N(A− c)
2B
+
c
2B
N
∑
k=1
ek− N−12
N
∑
k=1
Eqk
⇐⇒
N
∑
k=1
Eqk =
1
B(N+1)
[
N(A− c)+ c
N
∑
k=1
ek
]
. (5)
On the other hand, (4) can be written as
Eqk =
A− c(1− ek)
2B
− 1
2
(
N
∑
l=1
Eql−Eqk
)
⇐⇒ 1
2
Eqk =
A− c(1− ek)
2B
− 1
2B(N+1)
·
[
N(A− c)+ c
N
∑
k=1
ek
]
⇐⇒ Eqk = A− c+ c(Nek− e−k)B(N+1) , (6)
where e−k = ∑l∈K\{k} el . Thus, using the fact that Eq−k = ∑Nl=1Eql −Eqk, and substituting for
∑Nl=1Eql and Eqk from (5) and (6), from (3) we obtain the quantity and profit of each firm in the
Bayesian Cournot equilibrium, which are respectively given by:
qk(ck, ek, e−k) =
2A− (N+1)ck +(N−1)c(1+ ek)−2ce−k
2B(N+1)
=
2a− (N+1)θck +(N−1)θc(1+ ek)−2θce−k
2(N+1)
, (7)
pik(ck, ek, e−k) =
(
2a− (N+1)θck +(N−1)θc(1+ ek)−2θce−k
2(N+1)
)2
. (8)
The expression in (7) is obtained by using the facts that a ≡ A/B and θ ≡ 1/B. At date 1, each
firm k chooses the optimal managerial incentives to solve
max
ek
ekpik(0, ek, e−k)+(1− ek)pik(c, ek, e−k)− e2k . (9)
The expected value of cost reduction, ∆pik(ek, e−k) := pik(0, ek, e−k)−pik(c, ek, e−k) of firm k is
given by:
∆pik(ek, e−k) =
θc[4a+θc(N−3)+2θc(N−1)ek−4θce−k]
4(N+1)
. (10)
Also, note that
ek · ∂pik(0, ek, e−k)∂ek +(1− ek) ·
∂pik(c, ek, e−k)
∂ek
=
θc(N−1)[a−θc+θc(Nek− e−k)]
(N+1)2
. (11)
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Using the expressions (10) and (11), the first-order condition of the maximization problem in (9)
is given by:
∆pik(ek, e−k)+ ek · ∂pik(0, ek, e−k)∂ek +(1− ek) ·
∂pik(c, ek, e−k)
∂ek
= 2ek
⇐⇒ θc[8aN+θc(N
2−6N+1)+6θc(N2−1)ek−8θcNe−k]
4(N+1)2
= 2ek. (FOC′k)
Condition (FOC′k) implicitly defines the best response (in effort) ek(e−k) of the manager at firm k,
which is given by:
ek(e−k) =
θc[8aN+θc(N2−6N+1)
2[4(N+1)2−θ 2c2(3N+1)(N−1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
α(N,a,θc)
−
(
4θ 2c2N
4(N+1)2−θ 2c2(3N+1)(N−1)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
β (N,a,θc)
e−k
(BR′k)
The best response is linear ek(e−k) = α−βe−k, where α ≡ α(N, a, θc) and β ≡ β (N, a, θc) are
constants. Let eK = ∑k∈K ek. Summing over all k, in equilibrium: eK = Nα−β ∑k e−k. Thus,
eK =
Nα
1+β (N−1) ,
where we use ∑k e−k = (N−1)eK . As eK = e−k + ek, the equilibrium effort is given by:
ek =
α
1+β (N−1) .
Replacing the values for the constants α and β yields the equilibrium effort given in (EC). In other
words, effort choices are strategic substitutes, and there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Next, we show that the second order condition is satisfied for every firm if all of them produce
a positive output in equilibrium. Note that the second-order condition of firm k’s maximization
problem (9) is given by:
2
(
∂∆pik
∂ek
)
+ ek · ∂
2∆pik
∂e2k
+
∂ 2pik(c, ·)
∂e2k
−2≤ 0
⇐⇒ θ
2c2(N−1)
(N+1)
+
θ 2c2(N−1)2
2(N+1)2
−2≤ 0. (SOCk)
Note that (SOCk) holds if N = 1, and it is equivalent to
θc≤ 2(N+1)√
(N−1)(3N+1) for N ≥ 2. (SOC
′
k)
Let qk(ck) be the equilibrium output of a firm with realized marginal cost ck, i.e., qk(ck)= qk(ck, ek, e−k)
with ek = e(N) for every k ∈ K. From (7), it follows that qk(c) = qk(0)−θc/2, so qk(c) > 0 for
all k implies
θc <
2
N∑k
qk(0). (12)
The upper bound on θc in (12) is lower than the one in (SOC′k) as, by construction, ∑k qk(0) < 1
(otherwise the equilibrium price would be negative), and N(N + 1)/
√
(N−1)(3N+1) > 1 for
each N ≥ 2.
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(b) We prove the existence of c¯ ∈ (0, a/θ) such that c ∈ (0, c¯) implies qk(ck) > 0 in equilibrium for
every k ∈ K and ck ∈ {0,c}. Fix N ≥ 1. Write e(N, c) ≡ e(N). From (7), see that the symmetric
equilibrium production of a high-cost firm is lower than that of a low-cost firm and satisfies:
qk(c) =
2(a−θc)−θc(N−1)e(N, c)
2(N+1)
> 0 ⇐⇒ f (N, c)≡ 2(a−θc)
θc(N−1) − e(N, c)> 0. (13)
Note that
lim
c→0
f (N, c) = ∞,
f (N, a/θ) = 0− a
2(N+1)2
2[4(N+1)2+a2(N−1)2] < 0.
Therefore, by Intermediate Value Theorem, there is c0 ∈ (0, a/θ) such that f (N, c0) = 0. If c0
is unique, then take c¯ = c0. Otherwise, take c¯ = min{c0}. Next, we prove that e(N, c) > 0 for
c ∈ (0, c¯), which is equivalent to the following:
8aN+θc(N2−6N+1)> 0. (14)
Given that a > θc, we have
8aN+θc(N2−6N+1)> 8θc+θc(N2−6N+1) = θc(N+1)2 > 0,
which proves (14) for all N ≥ 1.
(c) Fix N ≥ 1. Differentiating (EC) with respect to N we obtain
∂e(N)
∂N
=− 2θc(N
2−1)[8b2(a−θc)+θ 2c2(2a−θc)
[4b2(N+1)2+θ 2c2(N−1)2]2 .
The above expression is negative for a > θc. Next,
∂e(N)
∂a
=
8θcN
2[4b2(N+1)2+θ 2c2(N−1)2] > 0.
Finally, use the fact that e(N)> 0 to verify ∂e(N)/∂ (θc)> 0. Note that
∂e(N)
∂ (θc)
> 0 ⇐⇒ e(N)< 4aN+θc(N
2−6N+1)
2θc(N−1)2 .
Because of the interior solution condition in (13), it suffices to show
2(a−θc)
θc(N−1) <
4aN+θc(N2−6N+1)
2θc(N−1)2
⇐⇒ 4(a−θc)+θc(N−1)2 > 0.
The last inequality holds as a > θc.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3. 
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B Proofs
Most of the following proofs follow directly from the analysis of the base model, see Lemma 3 in
Appendix A.
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof directly follows from Lemma 3(a) with A = 1−QI , B = 1, and N = m. 
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof directly follows from the proof of Lemma 3 with A = A(m), B = B(m), and N = n; see
equations (7) and (8). 
Proof of Proposition 1
The maximization problem of each incumbent i is given by:
max
qi
qi(1−qi−Eq−i−QJ(qi+Eq−i)− ci)
⇐⇒ max
qi
qi[(1−C1κ(m))︸ ︷︷ ︸
A(m)
−(1−C2κ(m))︸ ︷︷ ︸
B(m)
(qi+Eq−i)− ci]
Therefore, setting a≡ a(m) = A(m)B(m) , θ ≡ θ(m) = 1/B(m) and N = n it follows from Lemma 3(a) that
e(m) =
θ(m)c[8a(m)n+θ(m)c(n2−6n+1)]
2[4(n+1)2+{θ(m)c}2(n−1)2] .
Recall that the subgame played by the entrants is equivalent to the base model with B = 1, a = A/B =
1−QI and θ = 1/B = 1. We cannot apply the bound in Lemma 3(b) directly as a depends on c (QI is an
equilibrium object that depends on the model’s parameters). Obtain the equilibrium output of a high-cost
entrant by replacing a = 1−QI and θ = 1 in (7):
q j(c,QI) =
2(1−QI− c)− c(m−1)eJ(m, QI)
2(m+1)
, (15)
where eJ(m, QI) is the optimal effort of the entrants given in (EE). Because low-cost entrants produce
more than high-cost ones in equilibrium, the interior solution condition is equivalent to q j(c,Q∗I ) > 0,
where Q∗I is the total output of the incumbents in the symmetric equilibrium. Note that q j(c,QI) is
decreasing in QI as
∂q j(c,QI)
∂QI
< 0
⇐⇒ 2− 4c
2m(m−1)
4(m+1)2+ c2(m−1)2 > 0
⇐⇒ m2(4− c2)+m(8− c2)+4+ c2 > 0.
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Hence, a high-cost entrant produces the least when all incumbents have low costs. Let qi(0) be the opti-
mal output of a low-cost incumbent, so the interior solution for each entrant j requires q j (c,∑i∈I qi(0))>
0. By (15), this is equivalent to
∑
i
qi(0)< 1− c− c(m−1) · eJ (∑i qi(0))2 . (16)
From (7), the equilibrium output of a low-cost incumbent is given by:
qi(0) =
2a(m)+θ(m)c(n−1)(1− e(m))
2(n+1)
. (17)
Because κ(m)→ m/[4(m+1)], a(m)→ 1, θ(m)→ m+1, and e(m)→ 0, as c→ 0, we have
lim
c→0∑i
qi(0) =
n
n+1
< 1 = lim
c→0
1− c− c(m−1) · eJ (∑i qi(0))
2
.
Therefore, from (16), there exists c¯J > 0 such that every entrant produces a positive output in equilibrium,
provided c ∈ (0, c¯J). Furthermore, c¯J < 1−Q∗I as (16) also implies
c < c+
c(m−1) · eJ (∑i qi(0))
2
< 1−∑
i
qi(0)≤ 1−Q∗I .
Finally, we characterize the interior solution condition of the incumbents. From (7), the interior solution
condition for incumbents, qi(c)> 0, is equivalent to
e(m)<
2(a(m)−θ(m)c)
θ(m)c(n−1) . (18)
As e(n)→ 0 as c→ 0, there is c¯I > 0 such that all incumbents produce a positive output in equilibrium
provided that c∈ (0, c¯I), although the right-hand-side of (18) tends to∞. Moreover, c¯I < a(m, c)/θ(m, c)
because (18) does not hold if c > a(m, c)/θ(m, c). Define cˆ = min{c¯J, c¯I} to obtain the appropriate
bound. By Lemma 3(a), every firm’s second order condition of the optimal contracting problem is
satisfied if c ∈ (0, cˆ). 
Proof of Proposition 2
We first establish that κ(m) is strictly increasing in m. Note that
κ ′(m) =
(4+ c2)(m+1)2−4c2m2
[4(m+1)2+ c2(m−1)2]2 .
The numerator of the above expression is strictly positive if and only if
4+ c2
4c2︸ ︷︷ ︸
h(c)
>
(
m
m+1
)2
.
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Note that h(c) is strictly decreasing on [0, 1] with min{h(c)}= h(1) = 5/4 > 1. The right-hand-side of
the above inequality is always strictly less than 1 for m≥ 1. Hence, κ ′(m)> 0. Next,
a(m) =
1−C1κ(m)
1−C2κ(m) =⇒ a
′(m) =
(C2−C1)κ ′(m)
[1−C2κ(m)]2 =
c(8+ c2)κ ′(m)
2[1−C2κ(m)]2 > 0,
θ(m) =
1
1−C2κ(m) =⇒ θ
′(m) =
C2κ ′(m)
[1−C2κ(m)]2 =
(4+ c2)κ ′(m)
[1−C2κ(m)]2 > 0.
It follows from Lemma 3(c) that e(m) is strictly increasing in both a(m) and θ(m)c, and hence, the
proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof directly follows from Lemma 3(c) with A = A(m), B = B(m), and N = n. 
Proof of Corollary 1
The corollary follows directly from Proposition 3. Because e(n, m) is strictly decreasing in n by Propo-
sition 3, and esim(n+m) = e(n+m, 0), esim(n+m′)< esim(n+m) for every m′ > m.
C Numerical implementation
In order to show that the incumbents expected output at equilibrium is increasing in the number of
entrants, and the validity of Implications 2 and 3 in Section 5.2, we compute the model numerically. We
define a grid over the parameter space (c, n, m) ∈ C ×N ×M , where C is a grid of (0, 1) with each
cell of size c∗ = 7.6893e−6,N = {1, 2, . . . , 50}, andM = {0, 1, . . . ,50}. For each (n, m) ∈N ×M ,
we solve numerically for the upper bound of c, given by cˆ(n, m). We then show the validity of the
claims in every point in the parameter grid with c ≤ cˆ(n, m), accordingly. The cell size is given by:
c∗ ≡ 0.5∗min(n,m)∈N ×M {cˆ(n, m)}.
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